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INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States announced on May 13, 1975, that it was prepared to
attend a new preparatory meeting for an international energy conference.
The Government indicated that it was willing at the same time to consider
international arrangements covering the prices of raw materials other than
petroleum.' The announcement marked a significant departure from past
United States policy, and may have set the stage for a series of interna-
tional agreements on commodities, which have been called for and imple-
mented, but which have been often unsuccessful a number of times in this
century.
This Note will examine the economic reliance (or lack thereof) of coun-
tries, mainly "developing countries," upon the export sale of primary com-
modities. It will observe the price trends of the commodities and the rea-
sons why countries desire to establish international commodity organiza-
tions. The problems involved in establishing such organizations, as well as
the "developed" world's response to them will be noted. The most typical
arrangements employed by the agreements will be examined closely, while
a brief look will be taken at some less used commodity control schemes.
The history of failures, and a few successes, of the organizations will be
related. The economic arguments against such schemes as well as a num-
ber of guidelines will be presented.
II. THIRD WORLD RELIANCE UPON THE EXPORT SALE OF PRIMARY
COMMODITIES
Primary commdoities are the products of primary industries, which have
been defined as "those industries which supply foodstuffs and raw materi-
als by agriculture or mining in the form in which they are first exchanged
internationally."' All countries produce some primary commodities, but
none are self-sufficient. Developing countries (members of the so-called
N.Y. Times, May 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6. On September 1, 1975, the United States
indicated an even greater willingness to work toward "global consensus and economic devel-
opment." Included among the recommendations was one aimed at creating "consumer-
producer forfa]" on every key commodity. Such fora would encourage discussion on how to
"promote the efficiency, growth, and stability of each commodity market." Address by Daniel
Moynihan, United States Representative to the United Nations, before the United Nations
General Assembly, Sept. 1, 1975, in 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 425, 437 (1975) (speech written by
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger) [hereinafter cited as Moynihan Address]. The United
States also indicated its willingness specifically to enter into commodity agreements, in
addition to the discussions. Id. at 436-37.
2 J. ROWE, PRIMARY COMMODITIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 2-3 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as ROWE].
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"Third World") which have a surplus of one or more primary products
must export the products in order to finance the import of other primary
products or, especially, manufactured goods. Industrially developed na-
tions similarily export their surplus manufactures or primary commodities
in order to finance their own deficiencies, often of other primary products.3
Generally, the economic status of those developing countries which must
rely on trade in primary products to finance their imports is disadvantaged
in comparison to the economic status of developed countries. In developing
lands, the rural sector represents 70 to 80 percent of all production, while
in the developed nations the rural sector represents only 10 to 15 percent.4
Commodity exports of all types account for some 88 percent of the total
foreign exchange earnings of the developing countries. 5 Thus, the develop-
ing countries must rely primarily upon a sector which is plagued with low
levels of productivity, extremely inadequate economic infrastructures, a
productive community often unreceptive to new ideas, and insufficient
expertise for research and marketing.' It is contended by most authorities
that this reliance upon earnings from the export sale makes developing
nations quite vulnerable to market fluctuations, especially downward price
trends.' A wide range of factors in the areas of supply and demand lead to
this instability in the export earnings from the sale of commodities:
Supply Variables
(1) Political crises, wars;
(2) Business cycle;
(3) Subsidies, export policy;
(4) Surpluses and disposal;
(5) Market information;
(6) Shipping rates;
(7) New technology, methods of
production;
(8) New competition;
(9) Weather;
(10) Crop plagues;
(11) Crop production cycles; and
(12) Discovery of new resources!
Demand Variables
(1) Political crises, wars;
(2) Business cycle;
(3) Protection, import policy;
(4) Stockpiling and disposal;
(5) Speculation; and
(6) Synthetics, substitutes.
Id. at 2.
Cracknell, The Slippery Path to an Oilseeds Agreement, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 743, 753
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Cracknell]; see A. LAW, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS
2-6 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LAW].
' Fisher, Enforcing Export Quota Commodity Agreements: The Case of Coffee, 12 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 401 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Fisher].
Cracknell, supra note 4, at 753.
Hager, Commodity Agreements and the Developing Countries: a Collective Bargaining
Approach, 7 INT'L LAW. 309, 313 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hager].
I Id. at 315.
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For many developing countries, the transformation of raw material ex-
ports at home into processed semimanufactured and manufactured goods
offers an opportunity for greater development and less reliance upon the
sale of the commodities themselves. Tariffs in developed countries are,
however, generally such that the often less efficient manufactures of devel-
oping countries are, or would be, priced out of the markets of the developed
world.' Developed countries have introduced "generalized trade prefer-
ences" aimed at reducing the tariffs upon all products of developing coun-
tries.' But the developed lands have limited the thrust of the preferences
by placing numerous nontariff restrictions upon the imports. These include
restrictive licensing, quotas, subsidies, preferential purchasing arrange-
ments, and other administrative requirements." As a result, developing
lands have for the most part continued to rely heavily upon their earnings
from the export sale of primary commodities.
Developing nations contend that the growth of their export earnings
from increased production or prices over the years has been inadequate to
sustain a satisfactory rate of economic development. 2 The countries are
said to have
no means of cushioning the impact of a decline in the purchasing power
of their exports of primary commodities, whether brought about by a
decline in their export prices or by an increase in the prices of imported
goods and services. Consequently, developing countries. . . cope with the
rise in the prices of their imports of manufactured goods, occasioned by
rapid inflation in the developed market economy countries, only by se-
verely restraining essential imports or incurring greater indebtedness. 3
Some economists contend that there has not been a long run, downward
trend in terms of trade4 of primary products. 5 The United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) asserts, however, that there
has been a general increase in the price of imports to developing countries
and a general decrease in the price of exports from developing countries
from the mid-1950's to the late-1960's. The net deterioration in the terms
of trade during that period was assessed by the Conference at approxi-
' Mikdashi, Influencing the Environment for Primary Commodities, 8 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 144, 145-47 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Mikdashi].
" Id. at 147; see, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 501-05 (1975).
Mikdashi, supra note 9, at 147. The Trade Act of 1974 not only added the non-tariff
barriers mentioned, but also severely limited the number of countries which may receive
general preferences. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1975).
,2 1 UNCTAD, PROCEEDINGS 233, U.N. Doc. TD/97 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968
UNCTAD PROCEEDINGS]; see LAW, supra note 4, at 13-15.
'3 UNCTAD, Report of the Trade and Development Board, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 15,
at 31, U.N. Doc. A/9615/Rev. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 UNCTAD Report].
" "Terms of trade" is the ratio of the export price index to the import price index. 4
UNCTAD, PROCEEDINGS 73, U.N. Doc. TD/180 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1972 IJNCTAD
PROCEEDINGS].
"5 Schachter, Just Prices in World Markets: Proposals De Lege Feranda, 69 AM. J. INT'L
L. 101, 103 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Schachter].
1976]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
mately 12 percent. 6 Despite a 70 percent increase in commodity export
surpluses (excluding petroleum and petroleum products) from 1970 to
1974, the deficit in the trade balance of the developing countries more than
doubled in that period, totaling about US$10 billion.17 Ironically, in recent
years it has been other third world countries which have contributed most
to the decline in the terms of trade of the developing countries. The non-
oil-producing countries of Latin America had to expend some US$3.8 bil-
lion for oil imports in 1974. This amounted to about 37 percent of the
monetary reserves and 23 percent of the export revenues of the countries
in 1973.1s
Some commentators, however, sharply dispute the widely-held conten-
tion that the developing countries' reliance on the export sale of primary
commodities is detrimental. Data has shown that export instability (short-
term fluctuation in export earnings corrected for trend) has generally been
greater among developing lands, but not to a significant degree. 9 Indeed,
"[oln four different indices of instability Australia, Finland, and France,
for example, have much greater export fluctuations than Brazil, Ceylon,
or Panama."20 Through the use of simple correlation and multiple regres-
sion analysis, Alasdair MacBean contends that despite the apparent plaus-
ability of expecting the exports of developing countries to be highly unsta-
ble, they are not."' "Export instability appears to be hardly related to
commodity concentration at all, to be very weakly, if at all, related to the
proportion of exports which are primary goods, and to be negatively re-
lated, if anything, to geographic concentration." 2 Some experts argue that
the number of variables (i.e., the statistical method selected to correct for
trends, the coverage of countries and commodities, and the time period
examined) involved in such a study cast doubt upon such conclusions. 23
MacBean admits the possibility of such statistical inaccuracy, yet at-
tempts to show that the statistics are indeed accurate.2 4
Evidence has also indicated that export instability does not retard eco-
nomic growth.2 5 MacBean admits that short-term export instability has
II 1972 UNCTAD PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 73.
Wasserman, Interview with Gamani Corea, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, on the
Problem of Production of Primary Commodities, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 15, 18-19 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Wasserman, Interview]. When petroleum and petroleum products are
included, the export surpluses of developing countries rose 400 percent, while their import
deficit of manufactured goods rose only 55 percent. Id.
" INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC & SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE O.A.S., UNITED STATES ECONOMIC
COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA 79, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.H/XIV, CEPCIES/7 (1974).
11 A. MACBEAN, EXPORT INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 34-36 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as MACBEAN].
20 Id. at 34.
22 Id. at 34-48.
22 Id. at 48.
2 Meier, UNCTAD Proposals for International Economic Reform, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1173,
1185 (1967).
24 MACBEAN, supra note 19, at 48-56.
25 Schmidt, The Case Against Commodity Agreements, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 313,
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seriously reduced the ability of underdeveloped countries to achieve high
rates of economic growth, but he contends that for underdeveloped coun-
tries, in general, export fluctuation has not been an important obstacle to
economic growth and development."
Such statistics may validly represent the overall situation among devel-
oping countries, looked upon as an aggregate, since a number of underde-
veloped lands, containing the majority of the world's population (India,
Pakistan, Brazil, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, and the Peo-
ples Republic of China), carry on very little foreign trade as a proportion
of their gross national products." In addition, a number of others enjoy
only slightly more unstable proceeds than the average developed country
does." But such statistics do not alter the fact (indeed, the statistics pre-
sented by MacBean and others affirm the conclusion) that for a very large
number of developing countries, commodity exports represent the largest
proportion of their gross national products and that they are at the mercy
of the marketplace. 9
III. PICES
Income fluctuations caused by price changes have distressed producers
and their communities over the years.2 0 A major reason for greater fluctua-
tions in the price of primary products is the short run inflexibility of both
output and demand for raw materials as compared to manufactured prod-
ucts. It may take a lengthy period (because of growing seasons etc.) to
bring about a significant increase or decrease in production of many pri-
mary products such as coffee, cocoa, tea, natural rubber, or hard fibers.
Even a change in output of annual crops lags behind the market. Most
important production decisions are made months in advance of harvest.
At best, new price levels affect only the plantings for the next season., The
elasticity of supply and output to price changes is generally higher for
mineral products, but is still not substantial. Major costs are usually fixed
overhead. Mine operators tend to continue running as long as prices cover
316 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Schmidt]; see J. COPPOCK, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
INSTABILITY (1962).
21 MACBEAN, supra note 19, at 108-27.
21 Id. at 86. Yet even for the large, highly populated lands, terms of trade have been
"severely prejudiced" in recent years because of the rising prices of food, fertilizer, and
manufactures, in the absence of equivalent rises in their export prices. Schachter, supra note
15, at 103. Again, the OPEC pricing policy has been a most significant factor in the increase
of the price of manufactured goods to the developing countries. Wasserman, Multi-
Commodity Approach to International Agreements, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 463, 464 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Wasserman, Multi-Commodity Approach].
2 MAcBEAN, supra note 19, at 86.
" Hager, supra note 7, at 314.
3 Warmington, Stabilization in Primary Products Markets: an Analysis of Conflicting
Needs and Their Resolution, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 298, 298-99 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Warmington].
' MACBEAN, supra note 19, at 23-24.
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the operating costs. The closing and reopening of mines involve substantial
costs. Further, most mines operate on a shift system of labor and are thus
strictly limited in capacity to vary labor input. Therefore, in terms of
output and supply of raw materials, as a general rule, price fluctuations
do not lead to swift changes in supply.2
On the demand side, responses to changes in the prices of most food and
raw materials are slight. Price elasticity for food and beverages has always
been low. National custom, rather than relative prices, often determines
"whether people drink coffee or tea or eat maize, wheat, rice, barley or
potatoes as their staple food. 3 3 The cost of commodities often represents
only a fraction of the cost of a final product (e.g., raw cotton in a shirt or
aluminum in an airplane), so that a substantial change in the commodity
price will hardly be reflected in the price of the finished product.3 4
As a result, the low supply elasticity will mean that a change in demand
will induce a disproportionately large fluctuation in the price of a product.
Similarly, if the price elasticity of demand is low, a change in supply
caused by exceptional weather conditions, political crises, diseases, or the
like, will cause a sharp change in price also. 5
There have been large price fluctuations over the years. By the early
1950's, commodity prices were 21/2 to 3 times above the depressed levels
of the late 1930's, but only about 15 percent higher than the price of the
pre-Depression years of 1924-1928. The Korean War brought about excess
demand which led to a peaking of prices, followed by a declining trend for
a decade. By the early 1960's, prices of many important foods and raw
materials had reached relatively low levels. An upward trend in prices
began in 1963 and accelerated throughout the decade. Of 77 developing
countries and territories (excluding petroleum exporters) included in an
UNCTAD study, only 15 benefited from a significant improvement 37 in
terms of trade over the whole of the period from 1954-1956 to 1968-1970.
These 15 lands accounted for only one-sixth of the total population of the
77 countries in 1969. Forty-eight of the developing countries and territories,
accounting for over three-fourths of the total population, suffered from a
significant deterioration in the terms of trade. So, despite the number of
peaks in commodity prices, the fluctuation as a whole has not led to an
improvement, but rather to a deterioration of the buying power of the
majority of developing lands.3 1 UNCTAD reports that during the same
time span, the net barter terms of 24 developed countries included in the
11 Id. at 24.
33 Id.
1' Id. at 25.
35 Id.
11 1972 UNCTAD PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 74.
11 A "significant" improvement or deterioration means more than 5 percent. Id. at 77
n.10.
11 Id. at 77.
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survey increased 18 percent.39
The 1970's have shown extraordinary commodity price fluctuation,
spurred by shortages and rampant speculation in commodity markets.
Costs of copper, rubber, cocoa, coffee, platinum, and cotton rose sharply
in 1973 and 1974-many doubled or tripled in price. 0 In 1973, the price of
wheat doubled, the price of rice more than doubled, and the price of zinc
tripled. The aggregate price of non-ferrous metals exported by developing
countries rose 85 percent in the same year." The dollar price index of all
primary commodity exports rose by about two-thirds in 1973, and their
actual value rose by 40 percent.2 However, after the oil crisis pushed the
West into recession, commodity prices tumbled. Copper, for example, had
risen nearly 300 percent in 17 months, peaking at US$1.40 per pound in
1974. In May 1975 the price had fallen to US$0.56 per pound.'3 A number
of developing countries contend, however, that the recent price boom did
not benefit all developing countries. They also insist that the developed
market economy commodity exporters had been benefited more than they
had. They suggest that the gains of the developing countries were wiped
out by the inflationary rise in the prices of manufactures and other essen-
tial imports such as fertilizer, (often caused by petroleum price increases)
which served "not only to reduce the purchasing power of their exports but
in some cases had precipitated a drastic fall in their standard of living.'"4
IV. OBJECTIVES OF COMMODITY AGREEMENTS
The excessive price fluctuations and the tendency of commodity prices
to lose pace relative to industrial commodity prices, have led primary
producers to a number of actions. The basic purpose behind all develop-
ment activity is to improve the standard of living of the developing coun-
tries, mainly by altering "the regressive redistribution of income which has
been taking place between developed and developing countries." 5 This can
be done in a number of ways: (1) by including third world lands in progres-
sive, regional economic groupings; (2) by transferring technology, includ-
ing know-how and patents, to developing countries; (3) by lowering trade
barriers to their manufactured goods; (4) by promoting and expanding
their industries through investment; (5) by increasing financing of third
world projects through such agencies as the World Bank; (6) by increasing
3, Id. at 100. The phrase "net barter terms" may be used interchangeably with the phrase
"terms of trade." Id. at 73.
" TIME, May 26, 1975, at 71.
," Franck & Chesler, "At Arm's Length": The Coming Law of Collective Bargaining in
International Relations Between Equilibriated States, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 579, 598 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Franck & Chesler].
" Id. at 598.
" TIME, May 26, 1975, at 71.
" 1974 UNCTAD Report, supra note 13, at 23.
" SECRETARY-GENERAL OF UNCTAD, TOWARD A NEW POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT 43 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as UNCTAD, NEW TRADE POLICY].
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the use of international commodity organizations.46 Although this study is
concerned with the latter course, it is important to note that commodity
agreements alone (except possibly in unusual cases, as with the OPEC
nations) are probably not the solution to the problems of the developing
world. They may form, however, a significant component of a comprehen-
sive plan which, all parts working together, will eventually bring the stan-
dard of living of the third world to a closer level with that of the developed
world.
The ultimate purpose of a commodity agreement is to secure adequate
foreign exchange earnings for developing, primary-producing countries.47
UNCTAD, a strong proponent of the use of commodity agreements, sug-
gests that the agreements are aimed at securing "prices for commodities
which are equitable, stable and remunerative, as well as . . . [improving]
the trend of the commodity export earnings of developing countries by such
methods as the widening of access to the markets of the industralized
nations."" Commodity agreements are designed to alleviate the problems
of annual price instability, seasonal marketing difficulties, and pro-
nounced price trends. 9 The agreements are aimed not only at price stabi-
lization, but also at price augmentation in order to better the economic
position of the primary exporters. 0 In order to bring about such a change,
"[ilt is necessary . . .to face up squarely to the fact that the interna-
tional price of commodities would, in general, have to be supported at
levels higher than those which would prevail in the absence of interna-
tional regulation." 5 Developing countries aim to raise and stabilize prices
at the highest possible level that will not incur excessive production growth
or significant restriction in the expansion of consumption. 2 The conserva-
tion of natural resources53 has recently become an objective of certain
producers (especially the petroleum producers) because of the foreseeable
exhaustion of the resources in the not so distant future.
Therefore, the general purpose of lands in the establishment of interna-
tional economic organizations to control commodity prices is to improve
their standard of living through the stablization and augmentation of the
prices of their natural resources.
" 1968 UNCTAD PROCEEDINGS. supra note 12, at 387-408.
Wasserman, Towards an International Cocoa Agreement?, 2 J. WORLD TRADE L. 521,
537 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Wasserman, Cocoa Agreement]. For a discussion of 11
different goals of commodity agreements see LAW, supra note 4, at 75-81.
,1 Ahooja-Patel, UNCTAD, 3 J. WORLD TRADE L. 231 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ahooja-
Patel].
, Fisher, supra note 5, at 404.
50 Hager, supra note 7, at 310.
' UNCTAD. NEW TRADE POLICY, supra note 45, at 44.
52 1968 UNCTAD PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 236.
5' See E. MASON, CONTROLLING WORLD TRADE 140-41 (1st ed. 1946) [hereinafter cited as
MASON]. See also LAW, supra note 4, at 76.
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V. DIFFICULTIES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMODITY AGREEMENTS
Following the overwhelming success of the OPEC cartel, numerous
countries have made renewed efforts to establish similar agreements.5'
Establishing such an agreement and succeeding are two different prob-
lems. (Here the discussion does not concern the effectiveness of established
agrements, but rather the establishment of agreements.) The OPEC suc-
cess will be hard for other commodity groups to match. An effective com-
modity organization will need a good deal of economic "clout." OPEC's
power, in that respect, has not been approached by any other group of
primary products producers." Most of the commodity countries are not
protected against economic retaliation from importers to the extent that
the oil lands are. This is due to the oil producing countries' small popula-
tions and lack of dependence on imports.0 The oil exporters are few in
number, while those offering other commodities are usually numerous.57
While it is not necessary to control the entire world production of a com-
modity in order to stabilize and augment the price," the more comprehen-
sive the coverage (i.e., the greater the number of nations which join), the
more effective the agreement should be.59 Certain lands may be unwilling
to join the organization. There may be enormous differences between the
needs and views of the large producers and those of the small producers.
Small producers are often afraid to join, believing that their interests will
be sacrificed for the sake of agreement between the large exporters. New
producers and small producers which are expanding their production may
fear to enter into an agreement which may set up production formulae
based on past production levels. 0 Some countries may not be willing to
shoulder the heavy financial burden with which they would be confronted
in order to build up stock reserves."
Thus, those countries wishing to establish a commodity organization
face numerous obstacles. The nature of commodity agreements is such that
in order to be effective, a large percentage of all production of the com-
modity must be controlled. These obstacles may prevent such controls
and must be overcome before a worthwhile (from the producers' point of
view) commodity organization can be established.
11 N.Y. Times, May 14, 1975, at 5, col. 1. Recent attempts have included those by the
producers of copper, bauxite, iron, and coffee. Franck & Chesler, supra note 41, at 597-98.
Wasserman, Multi-Commodity Approach, supra note 27, at 466-67.
" N.Y. Times, May 14, 1975, at 5, col. 1.
' Id. There are other exceptions, however. Chile, Peru, Zambia, and Zaire export 80
percent of the world's copper; Malaysia and Bolivia export 70 percent of the world's tin;
Guinea, Guyana, Jamaica, and Surinam export 95 percent of the world's bauxite. Franck &
Chesler, supra note 41, at 598.
11 Gerhard, Commodity Trade Stabilization Through International Agreement, 28 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 276, 286 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Gerhard].
9 Id.
o The 1968 International Sugar Conference, 2 J. WORLD TRADE L. 464, 468-69 (1968).
s, Wasserman, Cocoa Agreement, supra note 47, at 526. For a discussion of these and
other difficulties see LAW, supra note 4, at 81-83.
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VI. THE DEVELOPED WORLD'S RESPONSE TO COMMODITY AGREEMENTS
The developed world has traditionally opposed the establishment of
commodity agreements. Such agreements have been called "charity in
disguise." 2 Fundamental economic principles, it is said, demand that
prices be related to the cost of production. "If commodity control is to be
used in this way to stablize prices at an artificially high level, the result
will be disastrous to the world's economy and to the growth of the world's
wealth at the maximum rate." 3 The contention is that if supply and de-
mand are not allowed to regulate prices and production, then land, labor
and capital will be left unused or misapplied.64 Developed lands long op-
posed any sort of a program which would include efforts to deal with the
problems of price fluctuations of all commodities. For that reason, the
preparatory meeting for an energy conference broke down in Paris in April
1975.65 Developed countries insist also that commodity agreements, if they
must exist at all, should always take into account the interests of both
producers and consumers."
In recent years developed lands have begun to move away from their
traditional total opposition to commodity organizations. They have urged,
for example, that:
(1) Where prices of primary commodities are clearly not reasonably
remunerative to producers, appropriate efforts should be made to
strengthen such prices to the greatest extent possible;
(2) Excessive price fluctuations should be eliminated;
(4) Product prices, inter alia, should contribute to providing produc-
ing countries with financial resources necessary to implement a policy of
economic expansion, including a commodity policy that helps over-all
development .... 67
Present announcements by the United States" indicate a new willingness
(forced by the realities of the petroleum situation) to attempt to solve the
problems concerning commodities.69 This and other developments (such as
the Lom6 Convention, to be discussed later)70 demonstrate that the devel-
oped world is coming to the conclusion that it must support the quest of
the developing countries to increase their standard of living, even if it
means a misallocation of resources, and perhaps, a reduction of their own
standard of living. Actions like the OPEC price increase and embargo seem
12 RowE, supra note 2, at 215.
3 Id.
Id.
N.Y. Times, May 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
" 1974 UNCTAD Report, supra note 13, at 27.
'7 1968 UNCTAD PROCFEDINGS, supra note 12, at 251; see LAW, supra note 4, at 92-96.
' See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
" N.Y. Times, May 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
7o See notes 114-23 infra and accompanying text.
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to be forcing the developed world into a position of a greater accomodation
to the developing world.
The developed world's "free market" attitudes toward commodity
agreements are often opposed by developing lands as inconsistent with
certain policies of the developed world:
If consistency is a measure, however, it is significant that neither ICA
[International Coffee Agreement] benefits accruing to developed produ-
cer countries (or to developed consumer countries under the multi-lateral
contract schemes), nor domestic farmer price supports .are commonly re-
ferred to as "aid." Furthermore, ICA benefits may be distinguished from
governmental grants in at least three important respects; (1) except in
compensating schemes, the burdens fall on individual consumers, rather
than governments; (2) depending upon the producing country's tax pol-
icy, the benefits accrue to individual producers; and (3) especially in the
production of raw materials, foreign investors from the developed coun-
tries may benefit in the form of increased profits.7
Protective tariffs in Western Europe enable domestic producers to receive
prices far higher than those prevailing on the international market. Subsi-
dies often allow Common Market producers to keep prices at a low-level.72
The United States has had until very recently a broad system of agricul-
tural price support. In Canada, a governmental agency exerts monopoly
powers over the marketing of wheat. In addition, a number of restrictive
business practices are allowed by the laws of many developed countries.
The most common of these are export cartels.
Export cartels of firms in developed market-economy countries may in
theory affect the export interests of developing countries in three ways.
First, they can discriminate against developing countries, in terms of price
or otherwise, in the sale of such products or they can refuse to sell to the
developing countries production equipment, vital raw materials or inter-
mediate goods which they need for their export industries. Secondly, ad-
verse effects on the export interests of developing countries may occur
when exporters from developing countries are confronted in their export
markets with powerful export cartels of firms in developed market-
economy countries. These firms may apply monopolistic practices, such
as predatory prices, to exclude developing countries' exporters. Thirdly,
export cartels of firms in developed market-economy countries may be
detrimental to the export interests of developing countries where such
cartels allocate export markets and where this allocation includes subsidi-
aries of the parties located in developing countries.7"
Other practices often allowed by the developed lands are restrictive
licensing agreements, which often limit the exportation of products made
" Hager, supra note 7, at 320.
72 UNCTAD, NEW TRADE POLICY, supra note 45, at 12.
13 Wheeler, Governmental Intervention in World Trade in Wheat, 1 J. WORLD TRADE L.
379, 383-85 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Wheeler].
7, UNCTAD SECRETARIAT, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 36 (1971).
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under the licenses. 5 In addition, there are certain less-used practices such
as: (1) import cartels (often set up to force lower prices);7 1 (2) rebate cartels
(agreements that require the seller to rebate a certain amount of the pur-
chase price in exchange for the purchase);" and (3) agreements on stan-
dards (product standards set up by trade associations, and competitor
agreements, sometimes on discriminatory bases). 8
Thus, the developed world's approach has been one of both ideological
opposition to, and a sometimes reluctant embracing of, commodity agree-
ments. At the same time, the states utilize or fail to outlaw a number of
interferences with the free market system which affects the ability of coun-
tries to export.
VII. SCHEMES USED BY INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS
A number of schemes have been used by the commodity organizations
to regulate the inflow of income from commodity export sales. Three of the
most common forms will now be examined in some detail and a number
of others will be briefly listed. It is important to keep in mind that the main
schemes are almost always used in conjunction with one or both of the
other two.
A. General Pricing Mechanisms
There are three traditional pricing mechanisms. The first is the "auto-
matic" scheme in which a control body sets maximum and minimum
prices, and within this range the market price finds its own level. The
advantage of the automatic scheme is that
the control operates openly and all concerned know where they are, so that
merchants can continue their business in much the ordinary way. It may
even be possible to maintain a certain amount of organized speculation
with its facilities for hedging. The job of the control is then obviously
much easier as long as its resources enable it to hold the price at the fixed
limits with absolute certainty. On the other hand, the price is controlled
only within the range-the bigger the range, the easier the control, but the
less the stability of the price."
The International Wheat Agreement,0 of this type, established the price
7 Id. at 19-34.
7 Id. at 5-9.
7T Id. at 9-13.
7' Id. at 13-14.
' RowE, supra note 2, at 195.
March 23, 1949, 63 Stat. 2173 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1957, 203 U.N.T.S. 179 (effective
for United States July 1, 1949 for parts 1, 3-5 and Aug. 1, 1949 for part 2) [hereinafter cited
as 1949 Wheat Agreement]. The subsequent wheat agreements were: International Wheat
Agreement, open for signature from April 13 to April 27, 1953, [1953] 1 U.S.T. 944, T.I.A.S.
No. 2799, 203 U.N.T.S. 242 (effective for United States July 15, 1953 for parts 1, 3-5 and Aug.
1, 1953 for part 2) [hereinafter cited as 1953 Wheat Agreement]; International Wheat Agree-
ment, 1956, open for signature from April 25 to May 18, 1956, [1956] 3 U.S.T. 3275, T.I.A.S.
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range for one quality of wheat (No. 1 Manitoba Northern in storage at Fort
William/Port Arthur), with formulae for deriving the minimum and maxi-
mum prices for other wheats and ports of export from the base type.8 '
Although prices were always maintained above the minimum until 1967,
difficulties arose whenever the minimum was approached." After 1967, the
control was unable to keep wheat prices above the minimum, because of
exporters' disposal of supplies in the face of an overall decline in require-
ments, and because of increasing competition from nonmember coun-
tries." In recent years the price of wheat has soared over the maximum
prices because of crop failures in different parts of the world.
The second mechanism is an arbitrary scheme in which the control is
free to fix the price where it will and to adjust products or quotas accord-
ingly. 4 The third mechanism is a compromise scheme, where the control
is free to act between maximum and minimum prices, but must sell or buy
a buffer stock at these prices to the limit of its resources and adjust produc-
tion to hold the market price at these limits. Through the utilization of
both of these pricing schemes,
No. 3709, 270 U.N.T.S. 103 (effective for United States July 16, 1956 for parts 1, 3-5 and Aug.
1, 1956 for part 2) [hereinafter cited as 1956 Wheat Agreement]; International Wheat Agree-
ment, 1959, open for signature from April 6 to April 24, 1959, [1959] 2 U.S.T. 1477, T.I.A.S.
No. 4302, 349 U.N.T.S. 167 (effective for United States July 16, 1959 for parts 1, 3-8 and Aug.
1, 1959 for part 2) [hereinafter cited as 1959 Wheat Agreement]; International Wheat Agree-
ment, 1962, open for signature from April 19 to May 15, 1962, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 1571, T.I.A.S.
No. 5115, 444 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective for United States July 16, 1962 for parts 1, 3-7 and Aug.
1, 1962 for part 2) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Wheat Agreement]; Protocol on the Extension
of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962, open for signature from March 22 to April 23,
1965, [1965] 1 U.S.T. 1010, T.I.A.S. No. 5844, 544 U.N.T.S. 350 (effective for United States
July 16, 1965 for parts 1, 3-7 and Aug. 1, 1965 for part 2); Protocol on the Further Extension
of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962, open for signature from April 4 to April 29, 1966,
[1966] 1 U.S.T. 948, T.I.A.S. No. 6057, 723 U.N.T.S. 346 (effective for United States July
16, 1966 for parts 1, 3-7 and Aug. 1, 1966 for part 2); Protocol on the Further Extension of
the International Wheat Agreement, 1962, May 31, 1967, [1967] 2 U.S.T. 1699, T.I.A.S. No.
6315 (effective for United States July 16, 1967); International Grains Arrangement, 1967, open
for signature from Oct. 15 to Nov. 30, 1967, [1968] 5 U.S.T. 5499, T.I.A.S. No. 6537, 727
U.N.T.S. 3 (effective for United States March 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Grains
Arrangement]; International Wheat Agreement, 1971, open for signature from March 29 to
May 3, 1971, [1971] 1 U.S.T. 820, T.I.A.S. No. 7144, 800 U.N.T.S 45 (effective for United
States July 24, 1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Wheat Agreement]; Protocol Modifying and
Extending the Wheat Trade Convention (part of the International Wheat Agreement, 1971),
April 2, 1974, T.I.A.S. No. 7988 (effective for United States July 1, 1974); Protocol for Further
Modifying and Extending the Wheat Trade Convention (part of the International Wheat
Agreement, 1971), open for signature from March 25 to April 14, 1975 (the United States has
not yet ratified the Protocol).
" 1949 Wheat Agreement, supra note 80, art. VI.
82 International Grains Arrangement 1967, 2 J. WORLD TRADE L. 233, 234-35 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as International Grains Arrangement 1967].
"3 Wasserman, International Wheat Agreement 1971, 5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 360, 361
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Wasserman, International].
11 ROWE, supra note 2, at 195.
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greater stability of the price may be obtainable, for the control can put
up the price appreciably to choke a market scramble, or put it down to
encourage buying. On the other hand, such arbitrary schemes are likely
either to bring ordinary normal merchanting and speculative activities to
an end, because it is too difficult to guess what the control may be going
to do next; or, on the other hand, if doubts as to the control's powers arise,
large-scale speculation may be stimulated and give rise to a situation
which the control may find is very difficult to remedy. The element of
secrecy has its advantages, but it means that the control must be very
strong."
The coffee agreement 6 employed the second scheme. The mechanism
was defective because it failed to take into account the difference between
the movements of three different types of coffees. If the prices for mild and
unwashed arabicas (types of mild coffees) both rose, while the price for
robustas (strong coffee) fell, the effect was to produce an above average
price which justified an authorization for an increase in supply which
would be disastrous for the robustas, while benefiting the arabicas. As a
result, an "escape" system was devised to allow exemptions from the sys-
tem under extraordinary circumstances .8
The tin agreement s follows the third scheme. Between the maximum
and minimum prices, where the buffer stock manager must buy or sell,
there are three intermediate price ranges. The prices are allowed to fluc-
tuate freely between the upper and lower limits. When the prices are in
the middle price ranges the manager may intervene at his discretion, but
95 Id.
11 International Coffee Agreement, 1962, open for signature from Sept. 28 to Nov. 30,
1962, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1911, T.I.A.S. No. 5505, 469 U.N.T.S. 169 (effective for United States
Dec. 27, 1963) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Coffee Agreement]. The subsequent coffee agree-
ments were: International Coffee Agreement, 1968, open for signature from March 18 to
March 31, 1968, [1968] 5 U.S.T. 6333, T.I.A.S. No. 6584, 647 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective for United
States Dec. 30, 1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Coffee Agreement]; Protocol Amending and
Extending the International Coffee Agreement, 1968, April 14, 1973, [1974] 1 U.S.T. 379,
T.I.A.S. No. 7809 (effective for United States Oct. 1, 1973) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Coffee
Agreement Extension]; Protocol for the Continuation in Force of the International Coffee
Agreement, 1968, as Amended and Extended, Jan. 1, 1975 (the United States has provision-
ally ratified the Protocol as of Sept. 30, 1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Coffee Agreement
Extension].
"' The International Coffee Organization, 1 J. WORLD TRADE L. 359, 365-67 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as International Coffee Organization].
" International Tin Agreement, done March 1, 1954, 256 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter cited
as 1954 Tin Agreement]. The subsequent tin agreements were: Second International Tin
Agreement, done Sept. 1, 1960, 403 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as 1960 Tin Agreement];
Third International Tin Agreement, open for signature from June 1 to Dec. 31, 1965, 616
U.N.T.S. 317 [hereinafter cited as 1965 Tin Agreement]; Fourth International Tin
Agreement, open for signature from July 1, 1970 to Jan. 29, 1971, U.N. Doc. TD/TIN.1417
(1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Tin Agreement]; Fifth International Tin Agreement, done
June 21, 1975, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1149 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Tin
Agreement].
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when they are in the upper or lower ranges, he must intervene." At differ-
ent times, however, the manager has been unable to keep the prices below
the maximum. 0
Developing countries recently have propounded a system whereby the
level of minimum prices for commodities would be related to changes in
the prices of manufactured goods imported by developing countries. The
price range would also be set to achieve a minimum rate of growth of export
earnings.9 ' The developing countries desire that this system of "indexa-
tion" should cover as wide a range of commodities as possible." Such a
scheme has been vigorously opposed by the developed world. 3
B. Buffer Stocks
A second scheme used quite often in connection with one of the afore-
mentioned pricing mechanisms is the buffer stock. UNCTAD has recom-
mended that buffer stock techniques be used as one of the methods for
market stabilization." In fact, the buffer stock is one of the most widely
advocated stabilization measures.95
Such a scheme involves fixing a price range within which commodity
prices are left free to vary but which is maintained by the stock agency's
purchases and sales. When price falls to the lower limit, the [buffer]
agency stands ready to buy the excess supplies at the floor price. Provided
the agency has sufficient funds, price can be held at the lower limit by
purchases for stock. If the price rises above the upper limit, the agency
sells the commodity from its stocks at the ceiling price, and so long as its
stocks last, the price can be held at or below the ceiling. The effectiveness
of the scheme . . . depends on the size of the gap between the ceiling and
the floor price and the ability of the agency to defend these. This latter
in turn depends on the resources of the scheme in the form of cash as well
as stocks of the commodity in the desired grades."
Since the scheme requires storage, only commodities which suffer insignifi-
cant deterioration in storage may be used, thereby eliminating a large
number of agricultural commodities.
In principle, the mechanism has great merit.
It interferes as little as possible with the free workings of the price
mechanism as an allocative influence on producers and consumers. More-
over, when it does interfere, it does so minimally, avoiding such distasteful
" Edwards, The International Tin Agreement, 3 J. WORLD TRADE L. 237, 243 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Edwards].
Wasserman, Fourth International Tin Agreement, 5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 355 (1971).
" 1968 UNCTAD PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 236.
" 1974 UNCTAD Report, supra note 13, at 24.
'3 Id. at 25.
" Ahooja-Patel, supra note 48, at 232; see LAW, supra note 4, at 71-73.
" MACBEAN, supra note 19, at 269.
"Id.
" Warmington, supra note 30, at 302-03.
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features as destruction of crops or restriction of output. It allows free entry
and exit to and from the industry, thus enabling the more efficient produ-
cers to grow and the less efficient to decline. These features make it as
nearly as possible a neutral influence on the efficiency of the industry and
in most cases neutrality is likely to be preferable. 8
The use of buffer stocks can prevent unemployment or underemployment
because there is less need to cut production in times of low demand, be-
cause of purchases by the buffer stock manager.9
However, there are a number of disadvantages to use of the buffer
stock. As already mentioned, perishable products (most fruits) cannot be
used. Another disadvantage is:
[Tihe size of the stockpile required to offset strong increases in de-
mand is probably prohibitive, as is the amount of reserve funds required
to stem price declines occasioned by severe demand contractions or supply
increments. Such schemes are effective in dampening the consequences of
minor shifts of supply and demand but not those of substantial changes. '®
If a scheme is to be successful in reducing price instability, the range of
price movements must be kept fairly level. A very large initial fund of stock
would be required for an agency to keep prices within a narrow range. For
example, a relatively modest stock of 200,000 metric tons of natural rubber
would represent an investment of around US$100 million at 1964 prices.9 ,
Once a stock is obtained, the financial and physical costs of holding large
stocks are usually heavy. Liquidation may involve serious financial loss.9 2
The tin agreements 3 which used a buffer stock found that the scheme
was often ineffective, as well as costly, in altering strong trends in market
prices. Regardless of the funds at the manager's disposal, the buffer stock
was acutely vulnerable to strong, sustained buying by speculators. In times
of shortage, there was often simply not enough metal to make an effective
contribution. , 4 Representatives of developing countries have proposed that
the financing of the buffer stock be equitably shared by the producers and
the consumers. The developed lands reacted differently to the suggestion.
Some accepted the proposition, but indicated that the criteria for cost-
sharing should be determined on a case-by-case basis; others rejected the
proposal while urging strong reliance on private and international
financial institutional financing by the developing countries. 5
In summary, the buffer stock is most effective when used:
MAcBEAN, supra note 19, at 269.
' RowE, supra note 2, at 189-90.
'0 3 G. MYRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA 2198 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 3 G. MYRDAL].
"' MACBEAN, supra note 19, at 270.
'0 ROWE, supra note 2, at 191.
"3 Agreements cited note 88 supra.
'° Edwards, supra note 89, at 245.
1968 UNCTAD PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 235.
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(1) where the main cause of price fluctuations lies in speculative
changes in demand and where speculators are often wrong;
(2) where production periods are relatively fixed and long;
(3) where the sensitivity to price changes in demand and/or produc-
tion is low, so that it takes relatively strong price impulses to bring about
an adjustment in quantities; [and]
(4) where the long-run market trends are comparatively stable.' °e
C. Quantitative Restrictions
The third major form of regulation is that of quantitative restrictions,
or quotas.
Regulation of export quantities by adoption of quotas forms another
method of moderating fluctuations in commodity prices. The over-all per-
mitted quantity of exports is determined at a level which will satisfy
current and expected demand at prices approximating to informed esti-
mates of long-run equilibrium price. Individual country quotas are usually
determined on the basis of historical market shares. Ideally, however, they
should take into account differences in cost structures in the exporting
countries and should allow frequent adaptation to alterations in produc-
tivity-increasing the quotas of the more efficient and decreasing those of
the less efficient. Adaptable quota schemes could achieve the same aims
as international buffer stocks without the high initial capital outlay, the
risks of financial loss, or the storage problems. '
The coupling of buffer stocks and quotas may provide the most effective
regulation of prices.'
There are, of course, certain disadvantages to the use of quota sys-
tems. Producers outside the control scheme are stimulated to increase their
output, resulting in an even greater need for output restriction by organiza-
tion members.' °9 A freezing in the existing pattern of production may
occur, which stifles technical progress."'0 Quota allocation schemes often
do not allocate production on the basis of cost or efficiency. Rather, the
allocation may depend upon "extraneous matters, ranging from the prior
volumes of exports of individual countries to the skill, persistence, and
eloquence of the country representatives.""' As a result, misallocation of
resources and inefficiencies in world production may occur."' Thus, the
quota system also has advantages and disadvantages.
D. Other Schemes
A number of other commodity control schemes have been presented.
' Gerhard, supra note 58, at 285-86.
,07 MAcBAN, supra note 19, at 273.
' ROWE, supra note 2, at 191; see LAW, supra note 4, at 73-74.
'9 ROWE, supra note 2, at 192.
1I0 Id.
. Schmidt, supra note 25, at 320.
"12 MACBEAN, supra note 19, at 274.
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1. Price Stabilization-Financial Compensation Schemes
One proposal is a system of international commodity price stabiliza-
tion with some form of international financial compensation paid selec-
tively by developed countries to the primary producing countries whose
foreign exchange earnings from a commodity in a specific year fall below
a certain percentage of their own trend in earnings.
In exchange for the advantages of commodity price stabilization, indus-
tralized countries would in this way agree to contribute selectively to
filling the worst of the troughs in earnings suffered by exporting countries
because of crop failures and similar circumstances. Governments of ex-
porting nations would be better able to plan schemes of development on
the basis of a reasonable guarantee of minimum levels of foreign exchange
earnings."'
The Lom6 Convention, " recently completed between member states
of the European Economic Community (EEC) and 46 African-Caribbean-
Pacific (ACP) states, fits partially into this category. The Convention in-
cludes, inter alia, provisions for trade cooperation,"' industrial coopera-
tion," ' financial and technical cooperation," 7 and provisions for export
earnings from commodities."8 With regard to the latter, the Convention
states:
With the aim of remedying the harmful effects of the instability of
export earnings and of thereby enabling the ACP States to achieve the
stability, profitability and sustained growth of their economies, the Com-
munity shall implement a system for guaranteeing the stabilization of
earnings from exports by the ACP States to' the Community of certain
products on which their economies are dependent and which are affected
by fluctuations in price and/or quantity."-
The EEC pledges' 2 to make noninterest-bearing 2' financial transfers to
ACP states whose export earnings (from exports to the Community of any
of 12 product groups)1'2 show a significant decrease in a particular year
' Warmington, supra note 30, at 307.
", Convention of Lom6, done Feb. 28, 1975, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 604 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Lom6 Convention].
" Id. title I.
US Id. title III.
"7 Id. title IV.
' Id. title II.
Id. art. 16.
12 Id. art. 19, para. 5.
Id. art. 21, para. 1.
'2 Id. art. 17. The groups include: (1) groundnut products; (2) cocoa products; (3) coffee
products; (4) cotton products; (5) coconut products; (6) palm, palm nut, and kernel products;
(7) rawhides, skins and leather; (8) wood products; (9) fresh bananas; (10) tea; (11) raw sisal;
and (12) iron ore. Id. It should be noted that, except for iron ore, decreases in export earnings
from mineral products are not included. Special treatment is given to sugar. See notes 166-
68 infra and accompanying text.
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from a reference level to be determined by the EEC Commission.'2 3 The
Convention does not speak, however, to the question of price stabilization
or supply commitments. The EEC is not gaining any of the advantages of
the stabilization-compensation scheme under discussion. The export earn-
ings of the ACP states are to be protected from depreciation. The EEC is
not protected from appreciation. Nevertheless, the Lom6 Convention does
provide an illustration of the way that the financial compensation segment
of a stabilization-compensation system may be implemented.
2. International Marketing Organization Scheme
Another solution involves a single international marketing organiza-
tion created with an effective monopoly in the purchase and sale of the
commodity. A multiple pricing system would be established. The agency
would purchase the whole of each season's output at purchasing prices
determined so as to stabilize total export earnings or foreign exchange
earnings of producers around a defined trend in revenues-prices which
might vary considerably from region to region of the world. It would then
set a selling price and sell any quantity demanded, but only at the one
uniform price.
Selling price and purchasing prices in any given year might be widely
different but would have to remain closely related to each other over the
course of the trend period as a whole, and would never get permanently
out of step.
This system, so long as it could confidently be seen to reflect the
market trend over the defined period, would avoid restriction of output,
raising of prices and distortion in the direction of trade, and yet would
satisfy the main criteria needed by each party.' 4
3. Long-Term Contract Schemes
A third, and fairly frequently used form is the multilateral or bilateral
long-term contract. When prices fall below an agreed floor, importing
countries purchase prearranged quantities of the commodity at the floor
price. When prices rise above an agreed ceiling, importing countries pur-
chase prearranged commodities at the ceiling price. Between the limits,
trade remains free. Such a contract (assuming it is enforced) assures ex-
porters of an acceptable income, and guarantees importers that they can
obtain a quantity of the commodity at a reasonable price. While prices
outside the contract are free to fluctuate to any degree, thus serving as a
'" If there is a decrease of 7.5 percent in total earnings from these exports (5 percent for
sisal and 2.5 percent for any export from a "least developed, landlocked, or island" state)
from one year to the next, then an ACP state may request an examination by the EEC
Commission. The Commission is to determine whether the decrease for one year represents
a similar decrease from the "reference level," which is the component of export earnings
during the four years preceding the year of application. Lome Convention, supra note 114,
arts, 17, 19. If there is such a "significant change," then the Commission shall authorize a
transfer. Id. art. 19, paras. 4, 5.
2' Warmington, supra note 30, at 307-08.
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guide for renegotiation of the agreement floor and ceiling, price fluctua-
tions within the scheme are moderated. As no quotas are imposed, easy
entry and exit of producers is allowed. Such a contract requires a relatively
homogenous product or one with grades of which differentiations remain
fairly constant. The scheme must have coordination of national production
and consumption policies in order to ensure long-term equilibrium. The
residual free market may be made much more instable as a result of the
controlled share of the market.' u
4. Hybrid Schemes
Lastly, developing nations have proposed schemes which involve a
number of these ideas, including price indexation, cooperative actions
among producers, wider usage of buffer stocks, and compensatory pay-
ments. 
2
It is evident that there are many possibilities which may be utilized
in a commodity organization. What system, or combination of more than
one, would be most effective is a question unanswered in this Note. Some
authors have suggested recently that a "collective bargaining" approach
will (or should) be used to determine what kinds of commodity agreements
are reached. The agreements ("contracts") would be arrived at by negotia-
tions of groups ("unions") of states facing other such groups, the resulting
agreements would represent the balance of economic power held by the two
groups.1 7 All of the benefits and detriments which are seen in the
employer-union relationship could be expected to arise if such bargaining
comes into wide use. It remains to be seen whether many groups of coun-
tries will be able to band together as effectively as employees have today.
Much of the power of unions today (at least in the United States) is derived
from rights given under various federal statutes. 28 Absent an international
legislature to create and enforce such rights for groups of countries, it is
less likely that the producer-unions will be able to emulate the status of
labor unions today.
VIII. COMMODITY AGREEMENTS-A HISTORICAL RECORD
At this point the history of commodity organization until World War
II will be examined generally. The record of several of the more important
commodity agreements since the war will then be examined specifically.
' MACBEAN, supra note 19, at 275-76; see LAW, supra note 4, at 70-71.
'u 1974 UNCTAD Report, supra note 13, at 26.
" See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); J. PINCus, TRADE, AID AND
DEVELOPMENT (1967); Franck & Chesler, supra note 41; Hager, supra note 7; Randolph, A
Suggested Model of International Negotiation, 10 J. CONFLcT RESOLUTION 344 (1966).
' E.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970); Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-67, 171-97 (1970); Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S.C. §§ 201-19(1970).
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A. Pre- World War II Commodity Agreements
Prior to World War I there was only one large-scale attempt to control
commodity prices-that of the Brazilian coffee producers who controlled
80 percent of the world supply at that time. The scheme entailed a farily
simple regulation of the coffee supply. It was not a success, though not a
complete failure. " ' After the war, a fairly large number of private cartels
arose, including rubber, sugar, copper, cotton, and tin. Most of these relied
on quantitative restrictions and price controls. The cartels were generally
successful in preventing an oversupply in a period of high demand during
the 1920's. Prices were maintained or increased throughout the period.13
During the Depression, both private and governmental commodity agree-
ments were concluded. The major schemes covered sugar, 3' tea, 32 wheat, 3
rubber, 3' copper,' and tin.'36 Of these, only the tin agreement, which
made use of a buffer stock and quantitative restrictions, was successful in
maintaining the commodity prices at a reasonably profitable level to the
producers. The remaining agreements were largely unsuccessful, plagued
by very small demand, often excessive production, and very low prices. 137
World War II brought an end to the organizations, replacing them with
direct governmental control.' As a whole, the experience of primary prod-
ucers was not a pleasant one before World War II. By the end of the war,
there was broad agreement that commodity policy should have three
(1) To develop an expanding world economy with an increasing pro-
duction and consumption of material wealth.
(2) To preserve a reasonable stability of prices about the current long-
period trend.
(3) To establish and preserve reasonably appropriate and stable in-
comes to primary producers.'
"' ROWE, supra note 2, at 122; see LAW, supra note 4, at 35-37.
' ROWE, supra note 2, at 120-29.
E.g., International Agreement Regarding the Regulation of Production and Marketing
of Sugar, May 6, 1937, 59 Stat. 922 (1945), T.S. No. 990 (effective for United States May 6,
1937). An agreement had been concluded in 1931 between producer associations in Cuba,
Java, and the major European exporters. ROWE, supra note 2, at 145-46.
"I2 The tea agreements were concluded by the tea trade associations of India, Ceylon, the
Dutch East Indies, and the British East African colonies. ROWE, supra note 2, at 149-50.
11 E.g., Final Act of the Conference of Wheat Exporting and Importing Countries, done
Aug. 25, 1933, 141 L.N.T.S. 71. While the United States took part in the Conference and
initialed the agreement, it never was ratified by the Senate. However, the United States did
follow the terms of the agreement. See RowE, supra note 2, at 152.
"I Agreement to Regulate Production and Export of Rubber, done May 7, 1934, 171
L.N.T.S. 203.
"' The copper agreement of 1935 was signed by the copper producers of Chile, Peru,
Rhodesia, and the Belgian Congo. ROWE, supra note 2, at 154.
13 E.g., Agreement on the International Tin Control Scheme, done Jan. 5, 1937, 7
INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 618 (M. Hudson ed. 1941).
'7 ROWE, supra note 2, at 136-55.
I3 d. at 155.
'3 Id. at 157.
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B. Post-World War 11 Commodity Agreements
Since the war, a number of international commodity agreements have
been established. The OPEC cartel has been an extremely successful com-
modity organization because of the ability of the producers of a commodity
vital to the developed world to act in unison in raising the price and
restricting the production of petroleum. The enormous economic power
held by the oil exporters has been sufficient to ensure success, even without
two major producers (the United States and the Soviet Union) as mem-
bers. Other commodity agreements have not been so successful.
1. The International Wheat Agreements
The 1949 Wheat Agreement 4 ° was a multilateral contract between the
governments of four wheat exporters (United States, Canada, Australia,
and France) and the governments of 42 wheat importers."' Developed
lands are the main exporters of wheat;'42 however, this is not true of most
commodities. The Agreement provided that when prices prevailing in the
international market reached or exceeded the equivalent of US$1.80 per
bushel of No. 1 Manitoba Northern wheat, the exporters would supply the
quantities allocated to each importer only at the maximum price."13 The
Agreement was a bargain for the importers because most of the time world
prices outside the contract were substantially above the maximum.' 4'
While a minimum price was also set,' the price did not fluctuate between
the extremes, but stayed near the maximum. 6
In subsequent years the Agreement was renegotiated. The 1953 Wheat
Agreement raised the maximum to US$2.05, 47 causing the world's largest
importer, the United Kingdom to withdraw.'48 Remaining out of the 1956
Wheat Agreement,"9 the United Kingdom reentered in 1959 when the ex-
porters agreed to supply, within the price range of US$1.50 to US$1.90
per bushel, "quantities sufficient to satisfy the commercial requirements
of those countries."'5 0 The importers agreed to buy, within the price range,
specified percentages of their commercial wheat import requirements.' 5 '
The 1959 Wheat Agreement's major "success" was that it gave the mem-
bers some assurance that nonmember exporters (especially the USSR)
"n Note 80 supra.
'' Wheeler, supra note 73, at 392.
42 Wasserman, International, supra note 83, at 360.
" 1949 Wheat Agreement, supra note 80, art. V.
' Wheeler, supra note 73, at 392.
,,' 1949 Wheat Agreement, supra note 80, art. VI.
"' Wheeler, supra note 73, at 392.
" 1953 Wheat Agreement, supra note 80, art. VI.
' Wheeler, supra note 73, at 393.
"' 1956 Wheat Agreement, supra note 80.
':" 1959 Wheat Agreement, supra note 80, art. 4, para. 2.
Id. para. 1.
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would not obtain an undue share of the world wheat trade.'52 The USSR
became a party to the 1962 Wheat Agreement.'5 3 The 1967 Grains Arrange-
ment"' raised the price range 5 and established a high level Price Review
Committee'56 empowered to make temporary adjustments in minimum
prices under exceptional market conditions which prevented a member
from making sales at the minimum.5 7 These agreements, despite the many
adjustments, have not had much influence in stabilizing the prices of
wheat.' 8 For instance, in 1969 the prevailing market price of reference
wheat had fallen from the official minimum price of US$1.73 to US$1.42
per bushel, leading all exporters to refuse the "honor" of having their
wheat declared "reference wheat." The price mechanism has simply been
inadequate to withstand the pressures placed upon it.'59 In 1971, the provi-
sions relating to prices were removed. The 1971 Wheat Agreement' 0 be-
came merely a forum for international cooperation and consultation and
as an information bureau. The price of wheat has since risen to dramatic
levels'"' because of crop failures. The failure of the agreements has been
attributed to the internal agricultural policies of the exporters.' The
agreements have always applied to commercial transactions only, while a
significant portion of the wheat trade has involved "concessional" transac-
tions by governments, which interfered with the system.' 3
2. The International Sugar Agreements
United States law'6 4 regulates the production of sugar (cane and beet)
in the United States and sets quotas for a limited number of foreign sup-
pliers who are allowed to import sugar. The United Kingdom has had a
similar policy whereby sugar is imported from Commonwealth lands.""5
The EEC has agreed indefinitely to purchase and import, at guaranteed
prices, specific quantities of cane sugar originating in ACP sugar export-
ers. " The Lom6 Convention establishes the specific quantities alloted to
"I Wheeler, supra note 73, at 394.
'3 Note 80 supra.
,s Note 80 supra.
'" See id. art. 6; 1962 Wheat Agreement, supra note 80, art 6.
'" 1967 Grains Arrangement, supra note 80, art. 31.
'" Id. art. 8.
' ' MACBEAN, supra note 19, at 287.
'' Wasserman, International, supra note 83, at 361.
" Note 80 supra.
"' Wasserman, Interview, supra note 17, at 16; see LAW, supra note 4, at 54 (figure).
12 MACBEAN, supra note 19, at 287.
", International Grains Arrangement 1967, supra note 82, at 236.
,' Sugar Act of 1948, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1101-61 (Supp. 1, 1971).
" The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement was an agreement made between the Ministry
of Food of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth sugar producers on December 21, 1951.
The United Kingdom's sugar regulations are found in the Sugar Act, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 48 (1956),
as amended, European Communities Act, c. 68, § 4(1), sched. 3, pt. 11 (1972).
,' Lom6 Convention, supra note 114, art. 25, para. 1.
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each ACP state'67 and the guaranteed price.'68 Several other lands (e.g.,
Portugal and the USSR) have similar special arrangements. 9 The resid-
uum of the world sugar supply (about 40 percent before the Lom6 Conven-
tion) has been covered since 1953 under the International Sugar Agree-
ment.' 70 The Agreement operated under an export quota system, aimed at
keeping the price within the range of US$0.0325 to US$0.0435 per pound.''
The control was rather unsuccessful in controlling sugar prices;' 7 they
ranged from about US$0.03 to US$0.05 between 1953 and 1960.'11 In the
early 1960's sugar prices soared for the following reasons: (1) Cuban pro-
duction plummeted; (2) the United States began its boycott of Cuba; and
(3) the United States readjusted its quota scheme.' 74 The 1968 Sugar
Agreement 7 ' assigned to each member a "basic export tonnage" and
adopted a minimum price of US$0.0325 per pound and a maximum of
US$0.0525 per pound.' 76 Importers agreed to limit their imports from non-
members, 7 7 and exporters undertook to supply specific quantities of sugar
to their traditional trading partners at a maximum "supply commitment
price," of US$0.065 per pound.' 71 Prices fluctuated wildly throughout the
1960's but have remained at a fairly high level in the 1970's because of
short supplies. In spite of the shortages, the dominant world market im-
porters, Canada and Japan, were able to obtain the bulk of their supplies
,s Id. protocol No. 3, art. 3.
6$ Id. annex.
,s Southgate, World Trade in Sugar, 1 J. WORLD TRADE L. 595, 601-06 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Southgate].
, 0 Oct. 1, 1953, [1955] 1 U.S.T. 203, T.I.A.S. No. 3177, 258 U.N.T.S. 153 (effective for
United States May 5, 1954) [hereinafter cited as 1953 Sugar Agreement]. The United States
and the United Kingdom, despite internal regulation of the importation of sugar, were also
parties to the Agreement. The subsequent sugar agreements were: International Sugar
Protocol, Dec. 1, 1956, [1957] 2 U.S.T. 1937, T.I.A.S. No. 3937, 326 U.N.T.S. 314 (effective
for United States Sept. 25, 1957); International Sugar Agreement of 1958, Dec. 1, 1958,
[1959] U.S.T. 2189, T.I.A.S. No. 4389, 385 U.N.T.S. 137 (effective for United States Oct. 9,
1959); Protocol for the Prolongation of the International Sugar Agreement of 1958, Sept. 27,
1963, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 2512, T.I.A.S. No. 5744, 569 U.N.T.S. 272 (effective for United States
Feb. 27, 1964); Protocol for the Further Prolongation of the International Sugar Agreement
of 1958, Dec. 23, 1965, [1965] 2 U.S.T. 1961, T.I.A.S. No. 5933, 569 U.N.T.S. 314 (effective
for United States Jan. 1, 1966); Protocol for the Further Prolongation of the International
Sugar Agreement of 1958, Dec. 22, 1966, [1968] 4 U.S.T. 4572, T.I.A.S. No. 6447, 610
U.N.T.S. 308 (effective for United States Dec. 21, 1967); International Sugar Agreement,
1968, open for signature from Dec. 3 to Dec. 24, 1969, 654 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as
1968 Sugar Agreement]. The United States is not a party to the latter agreement.
1953 Sugar Agreement, supra note 170, art. 20.
,72 Of course, the labels "unsuccessful" and "successful" are very much related to the time
frame from which the particular phenomenon is viewed.
... MAcBEAN, supra note 19, at 289-90.
,7' Southgate, supra note 169, at 608-09.
"i. Note 170 supra.
76 Id. art. 48.
Id. art. 28.
'T' Id. art. 30.
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at the supply commitment price, even though the price on the free market
was US$0.10 per pound. '79 A major reason for this extraordinary instability
in the free market price of sugar is the narrowness and residual nature of
the free market.'l Comparatively small changes in supply will produce
enormous price changes.' 8' In 1974, the phenomenon was observed at its
worst.'82 Since the expiration of the last agreement in 1973, sugar producers
and importers have not been able to conclude another. Until a sugar agree-
ment can control a larger share of the world market, there is little hope of
attaining a high degree of success in stabilization of sugar prices.
3. The International Coffee Agreements
Coffee is among the more logical candidates for a commodity agreement.
It is an object of relatively inelastic demand, is produced solely in develop-
ing countries, and has no close substitutes. It is the most important agri-
cultural product in the world in volume of sales, second only to petroleum
in all primary commodity trade.'85 The United States accounts for about
one-half of all world consumption, and the EEC accounts for another one-
fourth.' 4 Superseding a number of regional coffee organizations of the
1950's, the International Coffee Agreement'8 5 was concluded in 1962. The
Agreement established three different quota systems. First, there was a
basic export quota assigned to each country, representing the member's
share of the world market.'88 The second quota was the annual export
quota, based on an estimate of total world imports and probable nonmem-
ber exports for the year.' 7 The last was the quarterly quota,' 8 aimed at
ensuring orderly marketing throughout the coffee year.' 8 In 1965, a price
mechansim was added which established a ceiling and floor for the price
of coffee. Certain defects were encountered and partially corrected as noted
in a previous section.'98 When the Agreement entered into force, signed by
32 exporters and 22 importers, it represented 95 percent of world produc-
tion and consumption. The control of such a large percentage of the market
promised effective regulation, assuming the Agreement was to be ob-
served.'"' The duty was placed upon exporting lands to send certificates of
"I Smith, Sugar Markets in Disarray, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 41, 48 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Smith]; see LAW, supra note 4, at 50 (figure).
" MACBEAN, supra note 19, at 289.
"' Smith, supra note 179, at 45.
'2 See id. at 43-44, 61.
" Fisher, supra note 5, at 403-04.
'4 International Coffee Organization, supra note 87, at 360.
1962 Coffee Agreement, supra note 86.
" Id. art. 28.
" Id. art. 30.
I Id. art. 31.
"' Fisher, supra note 5, at 406-08.
IN See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
"' International Coffee Organization, supra note 87, at 368.
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origin with all coffee shipments. Each importing member had the duty to
prohibit the entry of any shipment of coffee from any member which was
not accompanied by a certificate. Sanctions were to be imposed upon the
exporter in the event of overshipment. The sanctions included: (1) reduc-
tion of the future quotas of a violator by the amount of overshipment for
one or more quotas; (2) double penalties for second violations; and (3)
quadruple penalties for third offenses.'92 The system was easily evaded as
certificates were often delayed or forged and there were no sanctions placed
upon importers who failed to enforce the Agreement. Another problem was
the weak regulation of imports from nonmembers.' In 1966 there was a
20 percent rise in the price of coffee. Millions of bags evaded regulation. 94
The African producers were very much unwilling to limit their growth and
often exceeded their quotas without effective sanctions being enforced
against them. Exporters routed coffee through "new markets" and non-
member lands (certificates of origin were required of neither) to the im-
porters who were often more than willing to purchase the less expensive
nonregulated coffee. 9 5 With time, however, the exporters tightened up the
certificate procedure, prohibited rerouting through nonmembers and new
markets and increased its membership to 99 percent of the world produc-
tion.' 9 The 1968 Coffee Agreement 9 7 further toughened the requirements.
The United States passed legislation to enforce the import controls.'19 The
1968 Coffee Agreement has been fairly successful in terms of price mainte-
nance and stabilization and has significantly improved the foreign ex-
change earnings of the coffee countries.' 9
At the end of 1972 the International Coffee Organization lifted all export
restrictions on coffee. 29 Fourteen countries, representing 90 percent of the
world production, subsequently established a new agreement among them-
selves, depriving consumer countries of any say in the regulation of prices
and supplies.29 ' The countries then agreed to the 1973 Coffee Agreement. 2 2
At the end of 1974, seven Central American coffee producers agreed to
withhold portions of their crops in an effort to bolster coffee prices. 23 De-
spite these gyrations, the countries have been successful in maintaining
the price of coffee;9 4 the Agreement has been renewed twice since 1973.2"5
I2 Fisher, supra note 5, at 409-10.
g" Id. at 410-11.
g International Coffee Organization, supra note 87, at 368.
Fisher, supra note 5, at 413-14.
' International Coffee Organization, supra note 87, at 368-69.
", Note 86 supra.
'g International Coffee Agreement Act of 1968, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1356f-56h (1970).
'" Fisher, supra note 5, at 431; see LAW, supra note 4, at 43 (figure).
2 Wasserman, Breakdown of the International Coffee Agreement, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L.
375 (1974).
2' Wasserman, 1972 Geneva Coffee Agreement, 6 J. WORLD TADE L. 612 (1972).
2 Note 86 supra.
"I Franck & Chesler, supra note 41, at 600.
24 Wasserman, Interview, supra note 17, at 19. This conclusion is not shared by all. Despite
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4. The International Tin Agreements
The 1954 International Tin Agreement 6 has been renewed four times."0 7
The Agreement includes both consumers and producers.2 It uses the pric-
ing mechanism discussed previously,0 9 which includes maximum and min-
imum price levels, the use of a buffer stock when the limits are approached,
and quantitative restrictions if necessary."' Throughout the 1950's and
1960's (except for 1967 and 1968), the price of tin generally rose above the
maximum, a result of short supplies and high demand. Buffer stock actions
were ineffective in controlling the prices. t ' This trend has continued into
the 1970's the 1975 price being at £3,740 per metric ton,"' up from approxi-
mately £700 per ton in 1956.1 These prices have brought significant bene-
fits to the tin producers (all of whom are developing nations), but present
tin resources are being exhausted at a rapid rate.' The Tin Agreement has
shown that even highly complex and coordinated measures may not be
able to control prices in the face of extraordinary demand.
IX. ECONoMIc DISADVANTAGES
The history of commodity agreements has been one of few successes.
Regardless of the scheme employed, the agreements tend to break down.
This Note has already examined the benefits to be gained from an effective
commodity agreement as well as some of the disadvantages. This section
will examine a number of economically oriented arguments made against
the use of the organizations.
A. General Disadvantages
The objections to commodity organizations are numerous. 21 5 The main
ideological objection is that the system interferes with free enterprise and
encourages inefficiency. 2'" The agreements are said to maintain the status
the Agreement, prices have tended to fluctuate to a large degree. "When coffee prices soar,
[commodity merchants] are deluged with contraband supplies at cut rates. When prices fall
back, the governments who said nothing or did nothing during the rise suddenly became
agitated." N.Y. Times, May 14, 1975, at 5, col. 1.
"1 1974 Coffee Agreement Extension and 1975 Coffee Agreement Extension, supra note 86.
10 Note 88 supra.
211 1960 Tin Agreement, 1965 Tin Agreement, 1970 Tin Agreement, and 1975 Tin Agree-
ment, supra note 88.
1 The United States has not been a party to the tin agreements, although the country has
announced its intention to join the latest agreement. Moynihan Address, supra note 1, at 437.
See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text.
z'o Edwards, supra note 89, at 243-46.
21, 3 G. MYRDAL, supra note 100, at 2194-95; see LAW, supra note 4, at 60 (figure).
212 Wasserman, Interview, supra note 17, at 21.
113 Edwards, supra note 89, at 244.
211 3 G. MYRDAL, supra note 100, at 2195.
2 For a preliminary analysis of the problem see notes 62-67 supra and accompanying text.
2,6 Hager, supra note 7, at 318.
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quo, thus freezing production patterns and aiding inefficient producers.Y7
The Coffee Agreements have indeed frozen market shares, yet they have
allowed a significant shift in production capacities."" From an economic
point of view, inefficiency is said to be inherently "bad." Even so, com-
modity agreements may partially make up for the inefficiencies they en-
gender by contributing to some of society's other economic goals, such as
growth, stability, and equitable income distribution.2 1
It is often argued by proponents of commodity agreements that sharp
price fluctuations produce uneconomical patterns of investment by induc-
ing heavy investment in periods of high prices, followed by low returns and
uneconomical use of capacity in subsequent periods of low prices and de-
mand.12 Some commentators dispute this contention, insisting that the
incentive to increase production during periods of high prices and to reduce
output when prices are low leads to a higher level and value of output over
the whole economic cycle and is thus desirable. 2 1 Commodity agreements
would eliminate these incentives in many cases and would be harmful.
The use of buffer stocks has certain disadvantages for those commodities
which are suitable for buffer stocks, (i.e., nonperishable goods). The cost
of acquisition and storage can be quite high.222 Liquidation may also in-
volve serious financial loss. 2 3
Some contend that even the price stability which commodity agree-
ments are intended to bring is self-defeating. A certainty of proceeds be-
cause of stable prices provides an incentive for some producers to increase
output, thus tending to lower the price. If product demand is relatively
unresponsive to price changes, the lower price will mean lower total pro-
ceeds .224
It is argued that consumer countries have an immense amount of
bargaining power. This power may be used by the developed world if
confronted with unreasonable demands by producers. Concerted actions
by consumer nations are likely to force the price of a given product below
that which would exist in a competitive market, to the detriment of the
producers.2 5
Commodity agreements are said to aid the wrong persons, such as rich
producers, without increasing the general economic level of the society. 226
217 Galloway, The International Coffee Agreement, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 354, 368 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Galloway].
211 Id. at 369.
219 Hager, supra note 7, at 318.
2 Mikesell, Commodity Agreements and Aid to Developing Countries, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 294, 296 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Mikesell].
22 Schmidt, supra note 25, at 313-14.
22 Id. at 314.
2 ROWE, supra note 2, at 191.
21 Schmidt, supra note 25, at 315.
21 Id. at 318-19.
220 Galloway, supra note 217, at 370.
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Such a problem can be remedied through an effective system of marketing
boards, export taxes, or a requirement in an agreement that part of the
funds received must be channelled into economic development, perhaps by
the commodity organization itself.227 Commodity agreements are said also
to help primary producers in the developed world, countries which are not
in need of economic assistance (e.g., a lead agreement would benefit Aus-
tralia and Canada; copper, Rhodesia and Canada; and cotton, the
United States).2
It is argued that commodity agreements are no more than forms of
foreign aid. That being true, the developed world, since it is committed to
such aid, should use it effectively not by helping all countries which hap-
pen to export primary products, but by helping only those nations which
show a willingness and potential to use the aid in a beneficial manner. 229
Many producing countries are said not to be prepared to accept the
amount of discipline and self-restraint needed to limit stock and produc-
tion. Many nations have scattered production, weak and ill-informed ad-
ministration, and inadequate facilities for holding stocks. Low cost produ-
cers or small producers have an added incentive to break agreements,
especially in years of good harvest and in cases of inadequate storage
space.21
All of these objections have some degree of validity. Some may present
problems which cannot be eliminated, but would have to be accepted by
the parties to a commodity agreement. Others may be avoided or mini-
mized through carefully planned schemes. And others may simply be
based upon residual feelings of superiority and paternalism towards the
p~orer nations by some in the developed world.
B. The Problem of Substitution
A major disadvantage, not heretofore discussed, which may constitute
an absolute bar to the effective control of some commodities and a threat
to all controls, is the problem of substitution.
The imposition of a higher price upon any good can only be an incentive
to eliminate reliance upon that good.' A number of primary commodities
are competitive with, or are close substitutes for, commodities or synthet-
ics produced by the industralized world (e.g., cotton, rubber).32 The in-
crease in price of such a primary commodity will almost inevitably lead
to substitution . 3
mId.
Schmidt, supra note 25, at 320.
2 See id. at 321.
2 McBEA, supra note 19, at 299.
21 Schmidt, supra note 25, at 317.
2n Mikesell, supra note 220, at 297; see LAW, supra note 4, at 61-63.
2u The United States is making extraordinary efforts to decrease its need for petroleum
through the development of other energy sources.
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Even in the case of commodities like coffee, there are limits upon the level
to which prices should properly be raised, even from the standpoint of the
long-run interest of the producing countries themselves. Not only is there
some elasticity of demand, as was indicated by the consumers' reaction
to the sharp rise in coffee prices during the mid-1950's, but high prices
would stimulate efforts to develop and market synthetic coffee. 
234
The high price of lead resulted in its replacement by aluminum and
polyethylene in sheathing for electric cables. Synthetic chocolate coating
has been developed and widely used in reaction to the price of cocoa butter.
Copper and aluminum compete with each other and with some plastics.
Wool and cotton have also lost ground to synthetic fibers. Although ba-
nanas have no near substitute, the consumer reaction to their high price
is to eat other fruits.
2 35
Sometimes substitutions are made almost immediately if price relations
change. This would clearly be the case, for example, with respect to differ-
ent grades of ore; in such a Case, prices would have to move together or
one grade of ore would lose out completely. Typically, however, substitu-
tion involves costly development of new products and/or costly adaptation
in processing and manufacturing by the user. Hence, within limits, users
are often reluctant to make substitutes. However, once the substitution
is made and the costs incurred, there is the same cost-inspired reluctance
to shift back to the original product. Hence, substitution is encouraged if
artifical supports maintain prices too high for too long, and it becomes
difficult to re-establish the original market.
2 36
The recent drive in the United States to conserve energy and to develop
alternative sources of energy is in direct reaction to OPEC's price in-
creases.
The developing countries view the large-scale production of pure substi-
tutes for natural materials as a waste of resources. They feel that heavy
expenditures on research and development connected with synthetics
would be more usefully devoted to the production of better and cheaper
machines, equipment, and other goods needed for the development of the
third world.2 37 Representatives of developing lands also feel that
the problems of producers of natural products experiencing competition
from synthetics and substitutes were aggravated by the existence of excess
capacity for the production of synthetics, unfair trading practices by syn-
thetic producers, captive markets, dumping and trade barriers inhibiting
exports of natural products in their raw and processed forms. 3
Representatives of developed lands argue that developments in the field
13' Mikesell, supra note 220, at 297.
135 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CONSULTANTS, COMMODITY PROBLEMS IN LATIN AMERICA 30
(1959).
236 Id.
13 1968 UNCTAD PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 237.
M Id.
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of synthetics and substitutes are an integral part of technological progress,
a necessity for the economic growth and welfare of all countries, and an
important factor in promoting demand for primary commodities.23 9 Devel-
oping countries have called for restriction on the output of synthetics
which merely replace natural products. They further propose that a num-
ber of barriers to natural products that are in competition with synthetics
be eliminated.240
X. GUIDELINES
The experience of commodity agreements in this century has made the
following guidelines incumbent upon all countries intending to establish
such an agreement.\
a. The commodity contemplated as the subject of an international
agreement should be one for which there are few substitutes over the long
run as well as the short run.
b. The commodity should be one for which there is a moderate inelas-
ticity of demand.
c. The commodity should be a major component of the export expendi-
tures of the developing country."'
d. The commodity should be a minor import expenditure of the im-
porter.24
e. The product should not be exported or even produced by the in-
dustrial nations.2 43
f. The price level should not be set so high as to initiate severe eco-
nomic repercussions in the developed countries. 244
g. The timing of the agreement may be important. Commodity con-
trols should be initiated at a time when prices are tending downward to
establish a better claim for sympathetic treatment by the importers. 245
h. A relatively static distribution of production within the industry will
create a greater chance for cooperation and success among the producers
than does an industry where growth rates and efficiencies differ widely
between the countries.246
i. A united front by producers is of upmost importance. As the situa-
tion may be one of power confrontation, a strong political base is necessary
to counteract the power base that the consumers will have.
247
231 Id.
240 Id.
21 MACBEAN, supra note 19, at 295.
21 The less significant the cost is to the importer, the less likely that he will seek alternate
sources or substitutions.
213 MACBEAN, supra note 19, at 295.
211 This may drastically reduce the demand for the product.
211 MAcBEAN, supra note 19, at 295.
248 Id.
247 Hager, supra note 7, at 321-22.
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j. The smaller the number of producers of the commodity, the greater
the possibility that a united front can be maintained.
k. The maximum possible percentage of all production in the industry
should be obtained in order to prevent nonmembers from effectively negat-
ing the price controls.
1. Strict controls should be placed upon the mechanism by which ex-
port quotas are determined and regulated, including the use of sanctions.
m. Discrimination in price with regards to different consumers should
be avoided to prevent greater consumer incentive to undermine the agree-
ment. 4 "
n. Careful technical control should be placed upon the operations of
the pricing mechanism or buffer-stock, as well as upon the quota system.
o. Flexible quantitative restriction mechanisms should be aimed at
allowing growth of, and preventing stagnation of, production methods.
p. The greatest chance of success (absent an enormous amount of eco-
nomic "clout") in establishing an agreement may well be to include con-
sumers in the decision-making process. The developed world is increas-
ingly recognizing the needs of the developing world. An appeal to the con-
sumer's desire for price stability and an appeal to his sympathy, especially
when backed by unity on the part of the producer, may well lead to cooper-
ation and a successful agreement.
q. All of the preceding guidelines have been aimed toward the producer
nations in the establishment of commodity agreements. The consumer
nation which wishes to prevent the establishment of a commodity agree-
ment (or the consumer nation which desires to undermine such an agree-
ment) may simply attempt the reverse of what is recommended for the
producer. For example, the consumer nation may attempt to develop more
substitutes, produce greater amounts of the commodity, develop consumer
unions, or appeal to the pecuniary interests of individual producers in
order to weaken the framework.
Obviously, no commodity organization would be able to meet the criteria
of all of these guidelines. Most, of the commodity agreements discussed
have been ineffective because of a failure to meet one or more of these
guidelines. To the extent that one criterion is not met, a greater effort
should be made to meet another criterion. It is extremely important for the
developing lands to realize that the industrialized nations are moving in
the direction of the third world's goals (witness the Lom6 Convention and
United States' recent announcement that it was willing to consider inter-
national arrangements covering the prices of raw materials). 4 ' This greater
understanding by the developed countries of the needs of the developing
countries, combined with a united, coordinated bloc of exporters, may be
all important for the success of most agreements. The desire of developed
", ROWE, supra note 2, at 186.
", See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
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nations for price stability, coupled with economic "clout" and persistence
on the part of the exporters may be quite effective in the stabilization and
augmentation of producer income. Of course, in times of extraordinarily
excessive supply or demand (whether high or low), almost any scheme is
likely to break down. However, this does not detract from the possibility
of success over the general course of events.
A commodity agreement can be beneficial to both the producer and the
consumer. If the consumer realizes that he can rely on a constant source
and a reasonable price, he may avoid the investment required to develop
synthetics; he may avoid the use of substitutes; he may decide not to resort
to measures which may undermine the agreement. While direct confronta-
tion may be successful for the consumer in some instances, it will also be
successful for the producer in other instances. The collective bargaining
approach, while still a form of confrontation, is an approach of greater
reasonableness than direct confrontation and is certainly a step forward.
But a cooperative approach may in the long run be most beneficial to all
concerned parties. The commodity agreement can be established to allow
planning by both producers and consumers. Such planning could enhance
the development of producers without significantly harming the economies
of consumers.
XI. CONCLUSION
The developed world is not yet ready for the "new world order" called
for by developing lands. It is moving in that direction. Commodity agree-
ments alone will not attain the goals of the third world. Commodity agree-
ments do not end the reliance by a country upon the export sale of a few
primary products; indeed, in some instances they may increase that reli-
ance. But the revenues obtained from the agreements can, if used properly,
aid in the economic development of the developing countries.
A recognition of the needs and goals of the other parties, a realization of
the economic and political power that each holds, and a resulting coopera-
tion by the parties will be the most successful method to achieve effective
international commodity agreements, as well as the "new world order,"
which may be inevitable.
Kenneth Klein
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